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This article attempts to explain how and why the year 2018 represented a major 
turning point for Chinese domestic politics, characterized by the transition from a 
collective authoritarianism to a centralized, repressive and personalistic authoritar-
ian leadership. It analyses the institutionalization and systematic legalization of the 
centralized Communist party’s authority in the political, economic and social sphere. 
For this purpose, the article contains a description of the major 2018 institutional 
reforms, through which the Chinese leadership rebuilt its centralized authoritarian-
ism into state and social institutions. Much attention has been devoted to the es-
tablishment of party and state supervisory commissions, the establishment of «super 
ministers», the reinforcement of political Marxist education, and the subordination of 
judicial power to the party’s will. Furthermore, the paper argues that one of the main 
reasons behind the creation of this repressive and authoritarian stance was the emer-
gence of multiple sources of social and political instability. The final part of the article 
focuses on the beginnings of an embryonic alliance between workers and students and 
on the increase of nationwide strikes.
1. Introduction
The year under review is specifically focused on China’s domestic pol-
itics, its domestic economy and on some of the numerous social questions 
that have been threatening the country’s social and political stability for at 
least two decades. 
China has suffered a severe economic downturn since 2009-2010. 
This in turn brought about a major slump in exports and the closure or 
reallocation of thousands of factories, followed by strikes and other forms 
of labour protests in the industrial and service sectors. Especially in rural 
areas, the central leadership had to deal with enormous ecological problems 
which together with local policies of land expropriation caused major forms 
of popular resistance. In addition there were growing tensions among eth-
nic minorities.
After two decades of the peaceful succession of top leaders, pre-emp-
tively organized by Deng Xiaoping (from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao), Xi 
Jinping’s rise to power in 2012 has been characterized by demanding fac-
tional conflicts. These caused the expulsion of Xi Jinping’s main rival, 
the Chongqing Party leader, Bo Xilai, and the beginning of a long and 
Asia Maior, XXIX / 2018
Francesca congiu
24
never-ending period of severe purges, all in the name of the fight against 
official corruption.1 
Since 2012, the Chinese party and state, led by Xi Jinping, have 
found their own way to deal with social conflicts and inner-party struggles. 
The years 2017, and 2018 in particular, were major turning points in do-
mestic politics, marking the institutionalization of a change in governance 
strategies. As was evident during the 19th Party Congress in 2017 and the 
13th National People’s Congress in March 2018, Xi Jinping’s doctrine of 
the «Chinese dream» definitively replaced economic growth as the major 
source of political legitimacy. As explained in the previous issue of this 
journal, the «Chinese dream» was a nationalist ideology aimed at reduc-
ing social inequality at home, and making the international order a more 
democratic system in which developed and developing countries could 
have the same voice. 2 According to this official ideology, the realization 
of the «Chinese dream», in terms of economic prosperity, struggle against 
poverty, equality, social harmony, democracy in international relations, 
mainly depended on the party and on the respect of its leader’s thought. 
Strengthening the party and Xi Jinping’s line inside it, was designed to 
enable the party itself (and especially the Politburo Standing Committee) 
to control every state, party and social organization at local and nation-
al level. This ensuing pervasiveness and omnipresence of the party once 
characterized the Maoist period, however, unlike the Maoist period, in 
the year under review, it became institutionalized and meticulously disci-
plined by law. More importantly, this new asset was conceived as the main 
guarantee of global capitalism.
This was in stark contrast to Deng Xiaoping’s original plan of the 
decentralization of party and state power, and the separation of party from 
state institutions, in an effort to make the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers more independent from the party’s will. In the Maoist era, the exces-
sively centralized Party authority was the cause of a major crisis of political 
legitimacy. Political reforms had to demonstrate serious intent on reducing 
the omnipresence of the party. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that 
inner-party struggles were considered a major problem to be contained, 
Deng Xiaoping’s and his followers’ strategies aimed at creating a collective 
leadership able to promote compromises among factions. Factions were not 
eliminated by accusations of corruption or purges from the party; rather 
1. Francesca Congiu, ‘«Due sistemi politici un’economia»: autoritarismo 
cinese e democrazia taiwanese alle prese con il neoliberismo’, Asia Maior 2013; 
‘La Cina sull’orlo di una crisi politica internazionale: l’anno del 18° congresso 
del PCC’, Asia Maior 2012; ‘Il ritorno dello Stato centrale e le implicazioni per 
la politica interna ed estera cinese’ Asia Maior 2011; ‘Cina: lavoro al centro’, Asia 
Maior 2010.
2. Francesca Congiu & Christian Rossi, ‘China 2017: Searching for Internal and 
International Consent’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 59-70.
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their rivalries found conciliation through the politics of compromise and 
harmony. 
Deng Xiaoping’s strategies succeeded for more than two decades. 
Then in 2012, these strategies began to be substituted by a centralized and 
personalistic authoritarianism. Partly because of its systematic legalization, 
this seems to have resulted in a more repressive stance than was ever the 
case in the Maoist era. 
In the following pages, the article describes the major institutional 
reforms which took place in 2018, through which the Chinese leadership 
established its authoritarianism, and the social protests which, for different 
reasons, represent a threat to social and political stability. The last part of 
the article will focus on an emerging alliance between workers and students 
in major strikes and demonstrations and on the increase of nationwide 
strikes in the service sector. 
2. Domestic Politics: Centralizing Political Power
This section analyses the year under review’s major institutional re-
forms across the political system (party and state institutions). These reforms 
have produced two specific interconnected outcomes: 1) an institutionaliza-
tion, legalization, and legitimization of a reinforcement of the centrality of 
the Communist Party of China’s authority over society, the economy and 
the overall political arena; 2) a parallel institutionalization, legalization, and 
legitimization of a severe shift from collective to individual power inside the 
party itself. 
According to the Chinese scholar Bo Zhiyue, the main objective of 
the process of political institutionalization as launched by Deng Xiaoping 
in 1978, was to produce a convergence between real political power and 
official positions in the party and state organizations, in order to counteract 
personalistic informal power, thus granting the attainment and manage-
ment of political power only to those holding official positions.3
During Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao decades, this process was accom-
panied by the need to build a collective and impersonal leadership in or-
der to facilitate the cohabitation among different political currents inside 
the party, to reinforce their ability and legitimacy in representing diverg-
ing social interests and to build independent state institutions. Ever since 
2012, however, that process has been accompanied by the need to build a 
single-oriented and personal leadership. The new leadership seeks reas-
surance by eliminating rival political factions instead of promoting com-
3. Bo Zhiyue, ‘The institutionalization of elite management in China’, Barry 
J. Naughton & Dali L. Yang (eds.), Holding China Together: Diversity and National 
Integration in the Post-Deng Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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promise and cohabitation. The result has been that the process of politi-
cal institutionalization, which in the People’s Republic of China has been 
largely party-driven, has facilitated the legitimacy of one-man rule. Xi Jin-
ping is not driving Chinese politics by means of informal and charismatic 
power, as Mao and Deng did. As demanded by the institutionalization 
process, Xi correctly occupies those official positions strictly connected to 
his real power. He has created by law the necessary conditions in order to 
be legally legitimized to be in charge of all the key decision-making points. 
Not only he is president of the PRC, secretary of the Party and chief of the 
Military Commission but he is also at the head of the quasi totality of the 
new central organs that have been created in order to centralize the po-
litical power. In these paradoxical circumstances, institutionalization has 
become functional to a convergence of duties and roles between the Party 
and the State and has produced a legal legitimization of the centrality of 
the Party. 
2.1. Institutional reforms across the political system 
In February 2018, the 19th Central Committee’s Third Plenum adopt-
ed a so- called «Plan of deepening reform of party and state institutions» (
深化党和国家机构改革方案) and the National People’s Congress’ session in 
March approved the plan. The plan was divided into eight parts and was 
meant to produce significant institutional changes in the party, as well as 
in the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, the military and in the public security 
sector, in mass and local organizations.
 From the analysis of official documents and press comments it is 
clear that the leadership was sufficiently aware of China’s critical issues of 
the period which Xi Jinping defined as the «new era». 4 China was indeed 
dealing with a lack of impetus in economic growth, official corruption, envi-
ronmental degradation, a growing gap between rich and poor and growing 
social and religious conflicts. Systematically legalizing a continuous consol-
idation of the Party’s unified authority and centrality in every field of the 
governance was deemed to be the safest solution to the impending social 
instability.5 
The planned massive institutional re-organization of Chinese politics 
was indeed aimed at strengthening and centralizing the Communist Party of 
China’s (CPC) role in politics, society, the economy and international rela-
tions throughout the reinforcement of Xi Jinping’s political influence inside 
4. Francesca Congiu & Christian Rossi, ‘China 2017: Searching for Internal and 
International Consent’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 59-70.
5. Dong Xiaoyu, ‘New Round of Institutional Reforms – Comprehensively 
Modernizing China’s System and Capacity for Governance’, China Today, 9 March 
2018.
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the party, and intended to bring about a drastic reduction of inner-party 
conflicts. As specified in its preamble, the plan served the need «to preserve 
the authority of the party, to centralize and unify its leadership with Xi Jin-
ping as the core […]».6 A statement provided in March by the Chinese state 
press agency, Xinhua, further reinforces the plan’s ambitions and scopes.
Forming a CPC leadership system that ensures the Party always provi-
des overall leadership and coordinates the efforts of all involved, […]. 
Promoting coordinated actions and resultant forces among the people’s 
congresses, governments, political advisory bodies, and supervisory, ju-
dicial and prosecutorial organs, people’s organizations, enterprises, pu-
blic institutions, and social organizations under the unified leadership 
of the CPC […]. The Party exercises overall leadership over all areas 
of endeavor in every part of the country. A primary task of deepening 
reform of the Party and State institutions is to strengthen the CPC’s 
leadership in every sector […]. The Party’s leadership should be streng-
thened over areas including deeper reform, the rule of law, economy, 
agriculture and rural work, disciplinary inspection and supervision, 
organization, publicity, theory and culture, national security, political 
and legal affairs, united front, ethnic and religious affairs, education, 
science and technology, cyberspace affairs, foreign affairs and auditing.7 
Among the several reforms established in the plan, it is worth mention-
ing the creation of national supervisory commissions both at the party and 
state level and of national and local commissions in every field of govern-
ance. The institution of supervisory commissions was meant to deal with the 
long-lasting struggle against the corruption of party and state officials as well 
as the promotion of party and state discipline. The intention behind the crea-
tion of any kind of local or national commission, was to create a convergence 
of decision-making power into single larger institutions, thus reducing the 
risk of power fragmentation and the emergence of diverging points of view. 
At the party top level,8 three new central committee commissions were 
established and chaired by Xi Jinping: a Comprehensively Governing ac-
cording to Law Commission; an Audit Commission; and a National Super-
visory Commission. According to Chinese official media, these three top 
6. The central committee of the communist party of China issued the 
‘Deepening Party and State Institutional Reform Plan’ (中共中央印发深化党和国家
机构改革方), full text, in the state council official website (www.gov.cn), 21 March 2018, 
in Chinese.
7. ‘CPC issues decision on deepening reform of Party and State institutions’, 
State Council website (gov.cn), 5 March 2018.
8. The role and the establishment of commissions at the state top level will be 
analysed in the following paragraphs.
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commissions were being established in order to strengthen the process of 
centralization and unification of the leadership of the Party, and to central-
ize its role in the building of a law-based governance. Its remit is to monitor 
the whole party system in order to improve its financial and economic order 
and the efficiency of funds.9 The four Central Committee Leading Small 
Groups — the Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform, the 
Finance and Economy Group, the Cyber Security Group, and the Foreign 
Affairs Group — were elevated to the rank of commissions (委员会); all of 
them chaired by Xi Jinping. The Central Committee Leading Small Groups 
(领导小组) are old informal institutions of the party system which have ex-
isted since 1958. They are directly subordinated to the party secretariat, 
reporting to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Their mission has 
always been to advise the Party Politburo on policy-making by formulating 
political programmes, and to coordinate the implementation of policy de-
cisions taken by the Politburo itself across state, party and military bodies. 
Being part of a commission means dealing with the entire process of poli-
cy-making in key political areas: the economy and finance; cyber security; 
foreign affairs. Moreover, the former Leading Small Groups were usually 
formed by one member of the Politburo Standing Committee (who headed 
the group) and by other relevant representatives of the government and 
party elite. In the newly transformed commissions, there are between two 
and four members of the Politburo Standing Committee in each group, with 
Premier Li Keqiang acting as deputy head of all commissions. 10
2.2. Party institutional reforms and political education: «make China Marxist 
again»11
The first part of the «Plan of deepening reform of party and state 
institutions» is dedicated to party institutional changes. The 5th, 7th and 
8th paragraphs are specifically committed to reforming education. The 5th 
paragraph foresees the establishment of a small central committee leading 
group for education, whose secretary would be located in the Ministry of 
Education in order to
strengthen the centralised and unified leadership of the party cen-
tral committee on education, comprehensively implement the party’s 
educational policy, strengthen party building in the field of educa-
tion, do a good job in ideological and political work in schools […], 
9.  ‘Party to have stronger rule of law role’, China Daily, 25 August 2018; ‘Xi: 
Audits to bolster clean governance’, China Daily, 24 May 2018. 
10. ‘The Remodeling of Chinese Policy-Making’, ChinaUS Focus, 19 September 
2018. 
11.  Timothy Cheek & David Ownby, ‘Make China Marxist Again’, Dissent, Fall 
2018.
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review national education development strategies, and major educa-
tion policies.12
The seventh paragraph deals with the foundation of a New Party 
School. The school is the main institution for the education and training 
of leading cadres of the party as well as the conduction of research on the-
oretical and practical issues, the promotion of Xi Jinping’s thought and the 
cultivation of Marxist theory. Party members were, indeed, invited to study 
selections of Marx’s works, particularly The Communist Manifesto.13 In the 8th 
paragraph, the plan foresees the establishment of a «Central Party Histo-
ry and Literature Research Institute» (中央党史和文献研究院) as a specific 
institution of the party central committee with the aim of enlarging and 
strengthening party control in the construction of the party’s history and 
theoretical background. By these means the party would have been able to 
lead and coordinate party history research, literature editing, and the com-
pilation of resources. Along the institute were converging and merging the 
Central Party History and Research Office, the Party Documents Research 
Office and the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau. The main du-
ties of the new institute were supposed to be: to research on Marx’s theories, 
Xi Jinping’s thought and Party history.14 
Throughout the year under review, Xi Jinping made a great effort to 
set out the reason behind the party’s wide institutional plan to strengthen 
political education among its members. In April, for example, during a Po-
litburo study session, Xi Jinping explained to its members the importance 
of reinforcing the study of Marxism in order to «enhance the party’s ability 
to use Marxist principles to solve the problems facing contemporary Chi-
na». Its invitation was clearly addressed also to the «broad masses of party 
members».15
It seems clear that in part, the CPC was deeply engaged in strength-
ening Marxism while at the same time embracing capitalism and riding an 
evident wealth gap and high levels of inequality: a third of the country’s 
wealth was owned by 1% of households and 25% of the poorest owned just 
1% of China’s wealth.16 According to the Hurun Global Rich List 2018 from 
the Hurun Report, China’s billionaires increased to 819, 40% more than in 
the United States. Interestingly, a significant number of billionaires (more 
or less 45) were occupying seats in the National Assembly and in the party’s 
top advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 
12.  ‘Deepening Party and State Institutional Reform Plan’ (中共中央印发深化
党和国家机构改革方).
13.  Timothy Cheek & David Ownby, ‘Make China Marxist Again’.
14.  ‘Deepening Party and State Institutional Reform Plan’.
15.  ‘A new class struggle: Chinese party members get back to Communist 
Manifesto basics’, South China Morning Post, 29 April 2018. 
16.  ‘Report: China’s 1 Percent Owns 1/3 of Wealth’, The Diplomat, 15 January 2016.
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there were 59. This organ included not only entrepreneurs but academ-
ics who, although they accounted for only 2% of the approximately 5,000 
members, in total controlled US$ 624 billion17. Hence, it is not too far from 
reality to imagine that, after the 1978 economic opening, party members 
(not only the billionaires) no longer, as in the Maoist past, analysed or dealt 
with contemporary social and political issues through a communist vision. It 
is common knowledge that, since the 1980s, there has been among intellec-
tuals but also party members, a wide circulation of ideas such as liberalism, 
constitutionalism, separation of powers and multi-party state systems. This 
epic transformation of the economy, society and ideas has produced, as of-
ten stated in this journal, great political instability inside the party which, 
on several occasion, has been an evident source of social instability. Xi Jin-
ping’s Marxist propaganda was thus just another strategy to unify the party 
around a national ideology and to «hold in this way China together». The 
president’s state Marxism was a strong determinant in China’s historical 
battle for international redemption, necessary to build the contemporary 
«Chinese dream» together with a strong party and a strong leader which 
presented themselves as the sole guarantee of China’s political, economic 
and international success: a prosperous, civilized society at home, and a 
world power abroad.
2.3 State institutional reforms: the 2018 revision of the constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China and the PRC Supervisory Law
In March 2018, the 13th National People’s Congress approved the 
fifth revision of the Chinese 1982 constitution. These revisions (in 1988, 
1993, 1999, 2004 and 2018) have substantially served the need to adapt 
the constitutional text to the radical social, economic and political chang-
es that have occurred in China since the launching of Deng Xiaoping’s 
reforms in 1978. Alongside previous revisions, the constitution has, for ex-
ample, included the protection of private property rights; the importance 
of the rule of law; the protection of human rights. The specificity of the 
2018 constitutional revision has been its contribution in further strength-
ening and centralizing the Chinese communist party’s role into the state 
organization.
One of the new amendments is, indeed, related to the abolition of the 
two five-term limits on the positions of president and vice-president of the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). It should be noted that the abolition of 
the term limits did not include the posts of premier, vice-premier, National 
People’s Congress chairman and vice-chairman. It would seem that the main 
scope of this change has been the extension of the term limit, beyond 2023, of 
the PRC president, Xi Jinping, who was also, at the same time, the CPC gen-
17.  Hurun Report, Hurun Global Rich List 2018, Hurun Report website, 28 
February 2018 (http://www.hurun.net/EN/Article/Details?num=2B1B8F33F9C0).
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eral secretary and the chairman of the Central Military Commission. Those 
last two positions – and not the presidency – were the real sources of political 
power. In fact, according to the constitution, presidential powers are mostly 
formal and politically not very effective. It specifies that the president has the 
duty to sign legislation adopted by the NPC and that the NPC continues to 
be, as in the Maoist past, a rubber-stamp for the Chinese Communist Party’s 
directives. The same proposal for the 2018 constitutional revision came, in-
deed, from the party’s top level before being implemented by the National 
People’s Congress in March. Quite significantly, the abolition of the two five-
term limits followed the important fact that the 19th Party Congress in Octo-
ber 2017 did not produce, as in the past, the name of a potential successor to 
Xi Jinping as party chief for the following 20th Party Congress in 2022.
A second amendment that better illustrates this issue and that per-
haps is even more significant than the abolition of the term limit, is the 
introduction of the centrality of the CPC leadership into the main text of 
the constitution. From 1982 until 2018, CPC centrality was indeed clarified 
in the constitution’s preamble: only during the most radical Maoist era had 
the role of the party been included in the main constitutional text (the 1975 
constitution for example). The scope of Deng Xiaoping’s economic and po-
litical reforms included a distinct separation between the powers of the state 
and the powers of the party; the independence of the constitutional law 
from the party’s will was one of Deng’s major political reforms. Under the 
2018 revision, the CPC sovra-constitutional role was openly restored and 
regulated into the constitutional main text through the amendment of the 
second paragraph of article 1: the sentence «the socialist system is the fun-
damental system of the PRC» was followed by «the leadership of the CPC is 
the most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics (中
国共产党领导是中国特色社会主义最本质的特征)».18
Furthermore, «Xi Jinping’s thought for the new era of socialism with 
social characteristics» was written into the constitution’s preamble, replicat-
ing its addition to the party constitution at the 19th Party Congress19. Like-
wise, some of the major themes that characterized Xi Jinping’s political 
discourse – such as the «great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation» (中华民
族伟大复兴) or «building a community of common human destiny» (构建人
类命运共同体) – were included in the preamble.20
The creation of Supervisory Commissions, already mentioned above 
(§ 2.1) was itself the subject of the 2018 constitutional revision. In the third 
18. National People’s Congress, Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2018 
Amendment), 11 March 2018, in www.lawinfochina.com, in Chinese and English.
19.  Francesca Congiu & Christian Rossi, ‘China 2017: Searching for Internal 
and International Consent’, pp. 64-70.
20. National People’s Congress, Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s 
Republic of China (2018), 11 March 2018, in www.lawinfochina.com, in Chinese and 
English. 
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chapter of the constitution, entitled «Structure of the State», a new section 
was introduced, section number 7 entitled «Supervisory Commissions» (
监察委员会). At the same time, Supervisory Commissions were also intro-
duced and disciplined through a national law: the «PRC Supervision Law» 
(中华人民共和国监察法).21 Constitutional amendments and the new law 
established a new supervisory organ of the state, the New National Super-
vision Commission, which was supposed to become the supreme supervi-
sory organ of the state. The new legal framework also foresaw the estab-
lishment of supervisory commissions at all sub-national levels, including 
provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities, autonomous prefectures, 
counties, autonomous counties, cities and districts. These local and na-
tional commissions, provided with extremely wide and undefined powers 
of surveillance, inspection, investigation and sanction, were in charge of 
monitoring the all-Chinese public administration activities and officials in 
the name of fighting corruption. Among the administrative officials to be 
monitored, the law explicitly mentioned CPC members, NPC members, 
State Council members, state-owned enterprise managers, and judges. 
Furthermore, the law granted supervisory commissions the power of de-
tention in custody in investigating serious corruption cases. The period 
of detention in custody had not to exceed six months. The law provided 
a few procedural requirements for the protection of the detainees, such 
as notifying the detainee’s family within 24 hours unless such notification 
may obstruct the investigation, and guaranteeing the detainee food, rest, 
and safety. In keeping with the law, the commissions had to exercise their 
powers independently from any judicial organs and free of any interfer-
ence by administrative and social organizations, or individuals. 
According to the Chinese law specialist Renzo Cavalieri, the main issue 
at stake was the clear intention of promoting and facilitating a convergence 
of resources and tasks between state and party supervisory commissions. The 
result was an extension of the CPC internal disciplinary system to the whole of 
the public administration, to be institutionalized as an ordinary disciplinary 
method of the entire state. Indeed, one of the outcomes of the establishment 
of supervisory commissions was a severe weakening of the judiciary power and 
the cracking down on its independence from the party.22 A similar opinion 
was shared by Amnesty International which stated that the PRC Supervisory 
Law «by-passes judicial institutions by establishing a parallel system solely run 
by the Chinese Communist Party with no outside checks and balances».23
21. PRC Supervision Law, adopted by NPC on 20 March 2018, in www.
lawinfochina.com, in Chinese and English.
22. Renzo Cavalieri, ‘La revisione della Costituzione della Repubblica Popolare 
Cinese e l’istituzionalizzazione del «socialismo dalle caratteristiche cinesi per una 
nuova era»’, Note e commenti – DPCE on line, n.1, 2018, p. 310. 
23.  Amnesty International, ‘China: New Supervision Law a systemic threat to 
human rights’, Amnesty International Latest News, 20 March 2018.
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3. The Domestic Economy
3.1. An overview of the main data
In July 2018, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released its 
China’s Economic Outlook in Six Charts. The first chart is related to China’s 
GDP whose rate of growth was estimated at 6.6% in 2018. Furthermore 
the chart focused on the rise of Chinese living standards, estimating that, 
since the launch of Deng Xiaoping reforms – whose 40th anniversary was 
celebrated in China throughout the year – more than 800 million people 
have moved out of poverty. The second shows a shift from high-speed 
growth to high-quality growth and forecasts China’s GDP overtaking that 
of the United States by 2030. The third chart focuses on Chinese govern-
ment and household debt rising as a percentage of GDP. The fourth elects 
China as the global leader in e-commerce and financial technology indus-
tries which, according to the IMF, were fundamental in the reshaping of 
China’s economic model. Finally, in the last two charts, the IMF suggests 
an increase in government spending for health and education financed by 
taxes on income, property and carbon emissions. This, according to the 
IMF, would help reduce inequality and pollution and speed up structural 
economic reforms, above all in the field of inefficient state-owned enter-
prises.24 In September, a new IMF chart on China revealed the country’s 
rising inequality. The Gini coefficient has indeed risen by 0.15 in 1990 to 
0.50 in 2018.25
Chinese official data, released in October 2018, revealed that Chi-
nese economic growth slowed to 6.5% year-on-year in the third quarter 
of 2018 to the lowest level since 2009, contrary to previous expectations. 
It is worth underlining that since 2011, when the economic growth rate 
touched 10.15% thanks to an enormous state financial stimulus, China’s 
economy has seen a significant slowdown with huge consequences for do-
mestic production and the labour force, with the growing phenomenon 
of factory closures and/or relocation, accompanied by minimum or zero 
compensation for employees. One of the main reasons for this unexpected 
further slowdown in 2018 was the ongoing trade war between China and 
the United States that, according to US data on trade deficit, effectively 
brought about a reduction of the US trade deficit with China year-on-year 
from US$ 375.576 million in 2017 to US$ 344.470 million in 2018.26 In 
addition to GDP, China released other economic data: year-on-year, in-
24.  IMF, China’s Economic Outlook in Six Charts, Country Focus, 26 July 2018.
25.  According to this unity of measure of inequality 0 represents perfect 
equality where 1 represents total inequality. ‘Chart of the Week: Inequality in China’, 
IMFBlog, 20 September 2018.
26.  United States Census Bureau, ‘Trade in Goods with China’, United States 
Census Bureau website.
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dustrial production grew 5.8%; retail sales rose to 9.2%; fixed-asset invest-
ment from January to September grew 5.4%.27
According to a statement by Yi Gang, the head of the People’s Bank 
of China, given in October 2018 before the International Monetary and 
Financial Committee, the Chinese authorities were focusing not so much 
on the quantity as on the quality of economic growth. In the first half of 
2018 consumption contributed 78.5% to GDP growth, an increase of 14.2% 
year-on-year; contribution of the service sector to GDP increased to 60.5%, 
1.4% more year-on-year; the use of clean energy too has increased. In the 
same statement, Yi Gang described the People’s Bank of China’s options 
in a series of opening-up measures in the financial sector, including easing 
restrictions on the establishment of foreign financial institutions in China.28
3.2. A reorganization of economic institutions: centralizing economic decision-
making powers
The Chinese Communist Party’s third plenum held in February 2018 
and the 13th National People’s Congress held in March 2018, also produced 
a quite significant change in the reorganization of the economic institutions 
in the state council.
First of all, there has been a general strengthening and rationaliza-
tion of several ministries by focusing on different duties hitherto dispersed 
among other ministries and agencies. One of the main consequences has 
been a reduction in the powers of the National Development and Reform 
Commission whose duties have been assigned to the new Ministry of Nat-
ural Resources, the new State Administration for Market Regulation and 
the Ministry of Ecology and Environment.29 The result has been the de-
velopment of so-called «super ministries» among which we have to add 
the Ministry of Science and Technology. According to the economist Barry 
Naughton, «Each ministry is designed to have exclusive control over an is-
sue area so that it can be an effective instrument for the top leader’s aspira-
tions».30 As previously mentioned, inside the party structure there had been 
an institutionalization of the former Leadership Small Groups dealing with 
economic policy-making during the first mandate of Xi Jinping. They have 
27.  ‘China reports economic growth below expectations – its worst pace since 
the financial crisis’, CNBC, 18 October 2018.
28.  IMFC Statement by Yi Gang Governor, People’s Bank of China People’s 
Republic of China, International Monetary and Financial Committee, Thirty-Eighth 
Meeting, 12-13 October 2018.
29.  ‘中共中央关于深化党和国家机构改革的决定’(‘Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Deepening the Reform of the Party 
and State Organizations’), 新欢网 (Xinhuanet), 4 March 2018; ‘国务院机构改革方案’ 
(‘State Council Administrative Reform Plan’), Gov.cn, 17 March 2018.
30.  Barry Naughton, ‘Xi’s System, Xi’s Men: After the March 2018 National 
People’s Congress’, China Leadership Monitor, n. 56, 2018, p. 8.
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been transformed into effective and formal commissions: the new Central 
Commission on Comprehensively Deepening Reform and the new Central 
Commission on Finance and Economics. This serves to strengthen their au-
thority in economic decision-making. The first deals with the restructuring 
of Chinese society, politics and economy. The second one serves the need 
to concentrate the Chinese Communist Party’s control on financial risks by 
reducing the leverage ratio of local government and companies, especially 
of state-owned enterprises, on poverty-reduction strategies, and on the fight 
against pollution.31
During the 13th Session of the National People’s Congress, four new 
vice-premiers were appointed revealing a plan for major changes in the 
economy, and, according to the assigned powers and portfolios, more fa-
vourable to pro-market structural reforms. The NPC appointed Han Zheng, 
also a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Han Zheng’s political 
career was built in Shanghai, where he was also born, as mayor (2003-2012) 
and as party secretary (2012-2017). Han is widely recognized as being a 
member of the so-called «Shanghai gang», the party political wing highly in 
favour of structural pro-market economic reforms and the one closer to Xi 
Jinping. His main portfolio, as vice-premier, is to be in charge of Hong Kong 
and Macau affairs. However, in addition he is, among the several offices, 
deputy head of the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepen-
ing Reforms and head of the Central Leading Group for the «Belt and Road 
Initiative» construction.32 The NPC also appointed Liu He who has already 
been Xi Jinping’s key economic adviser for the past five years. By becoming 
vice-president, Liu has assumed oversight of international commercial re-
lations, especially with the United States, the technology policy and policy 
coordination between the central bank and banking and security regulators. 
Among the other offices, it is important to note that he was head of the 
Financial Stability and Development Committee of the State Council; of the 
Leading Group for Building an Advanced Manufacturing Industry and for 
the Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises of the State Council. 
Liu is a close friend and trusted collaborator of Xi Jinping and his econom-
ic outlook is liberal. He contributed significantly to the elaboration of Xi 
Jinping’s economic paradigms such as the «economic new normal» and the 
«supply-side reform».33 The third appointed vice-premier is Hu Chunhua, 
31.  ‘Why China’s new economic commission cements Xi Jinping’s grasp on le-
vers of power’, South China Morning Post, 3 April 2018; ‘Xi stresses efforts to win «three 
tough battles», People’s Daily, 3 April 2018; ‘Xi presides over 3rd meeting of central 
committee for deepening overall reform’, Xinhuanet, 7 July 2018.
32.‘Chinese Vice-premier Han Zheng the «right» man in charge of Hong Kong 
affairs as city shuns political gridlock for economic growth’, South China Morning Post, 
28 June 2018; Han Zheng Profile, Brookings, March 2018.
33. ‘China’s Liu He takes broad economic role as vice-premier’, Financial Times, 
19 March 2018; Liu He Profile, Brookings, March 2018.
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taking over the portfolio on poverty alleviation. His career has been recent-
ly concentrated in Guangdong as Guangdong party secretary from 2012 to 
2017. According to his biography, he comes from a very humble and poor 
family and has constructed his political career on patron-client ties with Hu 
Jintao in the Youth League and on his career in Tibet. He was presumed to 
be a potential successor of Xi Jinping but contrary to all expectations he was 
not allowed to enter in the 19th Politburo Standing Committee34. The fourth 
vice-premier appointed was Sun Chunlan, responsible for education and 
health and holding considerably less power in comparison to Liu He and 
Han Zheng. She was widely considered to be a protégé of Hu Jintao and like 
him, more prone to social policy reforms such as housing, social welfare for 
low-income families, and poverty reduction.35
In March 2018, the State Council appointed its ministers and head 
of public institutions. Liu Kun was appointed as minister of finance and Yi 
Gang as head of the People’s Bank of China. On more than one occasion, 
the minister of finance has declared his commitment to the granting of 
assistance measures for those companies affected by the trade war between 
China and the Unites States. The aim is to reduce taxes and fees and to 
support the real economy and technological innovation.36
4. Social issues: Labour and Student Activism
4.1. The party and its «Marxist propaganda»
During 2018, party institutional reforms concerning political educa-
tion [§. 2.1] have been flanked by President Xi Jinping’s profound com-
mitment to strengthen the fundamental role of Marxism for the formation 
not only of party cadres but also of citizens. Ahead of China’s youth day 
(the celebration of the anniversary of the 4th May 1919 movement) and the 
120th anniversary of Beida (Beijing University), the president delivered a 
speech during an inspection tour of Beida.37 He stated that Marxism should 
be consolidated as the guiding ideology of the Chinese communist party, 
and promoted in campuses, classrooms and among students. He added that 
all universities’ schools of Marxism should pursue a political orientation. 
Zhang Huifeng, an associate professor at Beijing University’s School of 
Marxism, explained the meaning of Xi Jinping’s speech to the Global Times 
34.  Hu Chunhua Profile, Brookings, March 2018.
35. Sun Chunlan Profile, Brookings, March 2018.
36.  ‘China to adopt more proactive fiscal policy: finance minister’, Global Times, 
8 October 2018.
37.  It has to be said that the Beida had just set up the first School of Marxism 
in all China and that in January 2018 it had established the research institute on 
Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. ‘Xi 
inspires students with insight into education, Marxism’, Global Times, 3 May 2018.
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Elements of Marxism should be added to moral education in uni-
versities to teach our students to strive for ideals of Marxism and the 
happiness of humankind. In the future, Marxism education should be 
reflected in the overall curriculum.38
In 2018, the celebration of China’s youth day coincided with the 200th 
anniversary of the birth of Karl Marx (5 May). In a speech at the Great 
Hall of the People in Beijing, Xi Jinping commemorated Karl Marx, as «the 
greatest thinker in the history of mankind» and instructed all party members 
to take up the reading of Marxist works and study Marxist theories as a «way 
of life».39 Karl Marx’s celebration in China permeated state media with chat 
shows and cartoons for the young audience. The chat show «吗克思是对的» 
(«Marx was correct» or «Marx got it right») was on CCTV 1 (China Central 
Television, China’s main state-run television broadcaster) beginning on 27 
April 2018, for five episodes. Its aim was to persuade Chinese teenagers 
that the Marxist theories they were asked to study still held true despite the 
great economic and social transformations that have characterized China 
since the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s capitalist reforms.40 A Chinese cartoon 
on Karl Marx, entitled The Leader (领风者), and co-produced by the central 
government’s Marxism office, was shown by video streaming website Bilibili.
com.41 The aim was to tell younger students about Karl Marx’s life, his mar-
riage and his friendship with Friedrich Engels.42 
4.2. Workers and «Marxist» students joined in protest: the Jasic mobilization
The Jasic mobilization took place between May and December at 
Shenzhen Jasic Technology, a private firm specialized in the manufacturing 
of welding machinery. In terms of the intensity of workers’ involvement, 
strike organization abilities and requests for better working conditions, the 
mobilization has been part of serious labour unrest in Shenzhen over the 
current decade. However, its uniqueness is related to the fact that it has 
evoked an emerging and unusual alliance between workers and students 
and that, in a similar way to the 2010 Honda labour protests, recognizes the 
emerging need to autonomously establish a trade union. 
A group of workers has collected, in a short period of time, almost 90 
co-workers’ signatures (representing 10% of the factory workforce) for a pe-
38.  Ibid.
39. ‘Stick to Karl Marx’s true path, Xi Jinping tells China’s communist in 
speech to mark 200th birthday of «greatest thinker of modern times»’, South China 
Morning Post, 4 May 2018. 
40. CCTV website: news.cctv.com/special/Marx/index.shtml. 
41.  See the series in the website: https://www.bilibili.com/bangumi/media/
md4313622/?from=search&seid=18360488373211115553.
42.  ‘China produces Karl Marx cartoon series to mark 200th anniversary of his 
birth’, South China Morning Post, 19 December 2018.
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tition demanding the permission to autonomously establish a factory-level 
union in order to see their grievances – such as illegally manipulating work 
schedules, using a punitive system of fines, underpaying social insurance 
and housing funds and stringent workplace regulations – represented be-
fore the company and local authorities. 
The company reacted by creating its own «workers representatives’ 
committee», which excluded candidates nominated by the workers, dis-
missed activists, and made use of security guards against the growing work-
ers’ protests caused by those dismissals. However, defence of the worker-led 
unionization has grown, gaining supporters and sympathizers among other 
workers, Chinese leftist groups (such as the Marxist website «Utopia»), and 
those students who were organizing solidarity actions not only in Shenzhen 
but also in Beijing and several other cities. University students, proclaiming 
themselves «Marxist and Maoist students», organized themselves into a «Ja-
sic Worker Support Group» and flocked to the factory to demonstrate sol-
idarity with workers attempting to resist police assaults and prosecution.43
At the end of 2018, the Jasic worker-led unionization and its defence 
across China was forced to come to a halt: workers’ activists were arrested 
and the factory was placed under heavy police surveillance; students were 
interrogated, investigated, in some cases expelled from their universities, 
or even disappeared after police raids. At the international level, several 
well-known Marxist scholars, such as Noam Chomsky and Slavoy Zizec, is-
sued personal statements supporting Marxist students’ labour activism and 
stated their intention to boycott China’s official Marxist conferences in an 
effort to delegitimize CPC «Marxist propaganda».44 
As the Jasic mobilization clearly demonstrated, there was a growing 
and openly public militism among Chinese university students and leftist 
activists in general. Xi Jinping’s intention had been to use Marxism as a na-
tional flag and an instrument to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s 
authority over society, as it had in the past with economic growth (§. 2.2). 
Chinese university students and leftist activists, however, were trying to use 
Marx’s thought in order to understand China’s main social questions and, 
above all, in order to organize strategies of social and political unrest. The 
Chinese authorities, which proclaim themselves «Marxist», did not appreci-
ate the students own alternative interpretations of Karl Marx’s thought. In 
November 2017, some months before the Jasic unrest, the police detained 
43.  ‘Police raid student group as support for Shenzhen Jasic workers grows’, 
China Labour Bulletin, 24 August 2018; ‘China’s student activists cast rare light on 
brewing labor unrest’, Reuters, 15 August 2018. See also a video-document of the 
Jasic protests: Sacom (Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour - 大學
師生監察無良企業行動), ‘We want a real union – Jasic workers in struggle’, Youtube, 
31 July 2018, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=44&v=nYj-irbNMvo). 
44.  ‘Noam Chomsky joins academics boycotting China Marxism conferences’, 
Financial Times, 27 November 2018. 
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two recent graduates and four students who were attending a reading group 
at the Guangdong University of Technology in Guangzhou. The self-de-
clared Marxist reading group was organizing critical discussions of social 
and political issues. Most members were soon released but the organizers 
(Zhang Yunfan and Ye Jianke) were detained for «gathering crowd to disturb 
social order». In the following months, during the beginning of the year 
under analysis, more reading groups’ members were interrogated, detained 
and afterwards released.45
Paradoxically, university Marxist societies, which according to Xi Jin-
ping could have had a pivotal role in the spreading of Marxism in China, 
were also under heavy surveillance for their activism. A student-led Marxist 
society of Beijing University, in particular, was threatened with closure be-
cause it could not get the necessary backing from the faculty to renew its 
official registration as a civic organization.46
4.3. Workers in the service sector: nationwide strikes of crane operators and truck 
drivers
During the year under review, some of the most conspicuous and 
significant forms of workers’ activism have been in the non-manufactur-
ing sector. Its significance is related to the fact that strikes and protests in 
that sector seemed much more geographically widespread and less locally 
based than usual factory-based industrial unrest. An example of this phe-
nomenon was the crane operators’ and truck drivers’ disputes analysed 
below. Local authorities’ reaction alternated between repressive methods, 
such as arrest and detention of activists, and corporate strategies such as 
the granting of some workers’ requests and the spread of unionization in 
the service sector. In September 2018, the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions had about 303 million members, 140 million of whom were mi-
grant workers.47 
As revealed by the annual report on Chinese migrant workers, re-
leased in April by the National Bureau of Statistics, there was a gradual 
increase of migrant worker occupation in the service sector (+1.3%)48. And 
45.  See ‘Locked up for reading books: voices from the November 15th 
incident’, Chuang.org, 18 January 2018; ‘Let the people themselves decide whether 
we’re guilty’, Chuang.org, 14 June 2018.(https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_
continue=44&v=nYj-irbNMvo). 
46.  ‘No Place for Real Marxists in Communist China’, The Diplomat, 6 October 
2018; ‘Peking University students clash with campus guards over control of Marxist 
society’, South China Morning Post, 28 December 2018. 
47.  Chinese crane operators protest for better pay, working conditions’, Global 
Times, 1 May 2018. 
48.  国家统计局 (National Bureau of Statistics), 2017年农民工检测调查报告 
(2017 Migrant Workers Monitoring Survey Report), April 2018 (http://www.stats.gov.
cn/tjsj/zxfb/201804/t20180427_1596389.html). 
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as China’s economy moved away from export-oriented manufacturing, la-
bour unrest diminished. Workers’ collective actions in the service industries 
surpassed those in manufacturing for the first time since 2016, accounting 
for 21% of all collective action cases.49 
In 2018, strikes and protests in the non-manufacturing sector expand-
ed. In March and April, more than 2,000 sanitation workers in Shanghai, 
Liuzhou in Guangxi and Taiyuan in Shanxi went on strike to protest against 
cuts to their income and the lack of any safety equipment. Local authori-
ties responded by making several arrests which they would then temper by 
accepting some of the requests. Consequently, in Shanghai the minimum 
wage has been raised and workers receive their meal subsidy entitlement 
and shift allowances.50 Teachers have since organized at least 19 protests 
over pay, performance bonuses and pensions.
Between April and May, crane operators in the construction sector or-
ganized a nationwide strike demanding better pay and better working con-
ditions. China Labour Bulletin, the Hong Kong labour NGO, recorded at 
least a dozen strikes and protests in Sichuan, Gansu, Henan, Fujian, Hunan, 
Jiangsu, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Hubei and Guangxi. In the city of Chengdu 
alone, at least 10,000 workers joined the protest. Workers’ demands includ-
ed: salary increases to compensate inflation, increased overtime payments, 
formal labour contracts, regular monthly wage payment, social insurance, 
pensions. Crane workers organized though closed groups on instant mes-
saging apps such as QQ, and published videos and songs to widen support 
and consent. One of the main issues at stake, apart from concrete economic 
demands, was the role of the Chinese trade union, which was criticized for 
giving insufficient support to the strike.51 
Lastly, in June, thousands of trucks drivers, at least in a dozen places 
across the nation, used their trucks to block roads in protest against rising 
fuel costs. In November and December, they rose up again against the de-
cision of several major cities and provinces to ban trucks with high emis-
sions in order to fight air pollution. Although truck drivers agreed with the 
anti-pollution campaign, they denounced the consequential sharp drop in 
their income and the absence of government support for their businesses.52 
It should be underlined that truck drivers are, interestingly, the «lifeblood 
of a delivery system that sustains China’s e-commerce industry. And e-com-
49.  ‘As China’s economy shifts to services in Q3, so too does labour unrest’, 
China Labour Bulletin, 21 October 2016. 
50.  ‘Sanitation workers are out on strike again in China’, China Labour Bulletin, 
6 April 2018. 
51.  ‘Tower crane operators across China organise Labour Day strike over low 
pay’, China Labour Bulletin, 2 May 2018. See also ‘Chinese crane operators protest for 
better pay, working conditions’. 
52.  ‘China’s truck drivers strike over stagnant pay, high fuel costs and arbitrary 
fines’, China Labour Bulletin, 11 June 2018; ‘China’s truck drivers on strike again in 
protest at government emissions policy’, China Labour Bulletin, 3 December 2018. 
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merce is central to the Chinese government’s efforts to shift the economy 
away from export-led growth towards consumer domestic spending».53 For 
this reason, the truckers’ activism has the potential to paralyze the logistics 
behind e-commerce. Moreover, it represents a real threat to the successful 
performance of the Chinese political economy whose strategic aim was to 
avoid social and political instability. 
53.  ‘Why protests by China’s truck drivers could put the brakes on the economy’, 
South China Morning Post, 25 June 2018. 

